Saturday, October 8, 2011

Response to Jacob Wheeler's Post on 10/2/11 at 12:01pm

I would say that the situation you described above is about Tolstoy's argument that well-communicated art (perhaps interchangeable in his theory for "good art") is very infectious. Now, what happened in your scenario was discussed in class on Friday, and Johnson tried to make a mathematical expression explaining the situation, which in turn ended up turning infectiousness into a proportion of successful communications over the number of communications that were attempted, I.e. The number of times the work was viewed/heard.

With this spirit I would argue that the art would need more viewers and more judgments before it's status can be declared either way.

Friday, October 7, 2011

Transmitting the Emotions Necessary for Tolstoy's Theory

Another problem arose to me through Tolstoy's theory: two of the most important factors of defining art, he says, are its infectiousness and its content. If we reexamine Plato's theory, specifically in The Republic, we find that their is a "world of forms" and everything on earth - or everything physical, rather - is at least once removed from this world through imitation. How far removed then, I ask you, is the emotion being communicated to the audience through art?

For anything to exist, it has to exist in the world of forms. Otherwise the Gods would not know about it, but they know about everything, being omnipotent. Therefore, an emotion that we feel is an imitation of its true form in the world of forms. If we, being the artist in this scenario, were to transmit this feeling by portraying it in a work of art, the emotion within the piece would be an imitation of an imitation. Would this not make the emotion received by the audience members a 3rd-degree imitation, receiving a yet further-removed emotion?

Tolstoy argues in his What is Art? text that, in order for a work to have strong quality, it needs to be very infectious. This means that the artist has to feel the emotion strongly, the emotion has to be clear in the work, and that the recipient has to feel the emotion strongly. This seems to be a quizzical situation considering the above logic that I've provided through Platonic terms.

Help me figure this out - Does the emotion become weak, distorted, or false through all of this imitation, or does it remain strong and clear?

Obtaining the Emotions Necessary for Tolstoy's Theory

When we think of emotions, we think of the typical list - happiness, anger, sadness, fright - all of which are different states of your mood. However, Tolstoy doesn't delve into an important part of his theory - what are emotions, or how do we receive emotion?

A typical argument would explore how emotions come to us through experience. We learn emotions, but I would even argue that they are innate. Tolstoy would argue that emotions can't be based on the pleasure we receive from an activity or the lack thereof, because "If we sat that the aim of any activity is merely our pleasure . . . our definition will evidently be a false one." This is why he ventures further in his definition of art, arriving at the definition we know today, one that involves the communication of a specific emotion between an artist and an observer.

The problem I see in the grand scheme of things is that anything that you learn solely through experience has to have a starting place - whether your learn through the experiences of your models and then apply them to your own, or other circumstances. But in this way, you aren't learning emotions through experience, which causes me to question the origin of emotion. Therefore, I would argue that emotion is certainly (at least partly) innate. What do you all think - where do our emotions truly come from?